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The pervasiveness of context effects on evaluative responses has led to conflicting views as to whether evaluations reflect 
stable attitudinal representations that are directly retrieved from memory or online constructions on the basis of momentarily 
accessible attributes. The current research expands on this debate by investigating the formation, representation, and 
activation of contextualized attitudes, with a particular focus on the role of incidental visual cues of the environmental 
context. Five experiments demonstrated that (1) incidental visual cues tend to be integrated into the representation of attitude-
incongruent, but not attitude-congruent, information; (2) these cues are not directly associated with the valence of 
counterattitudinal experiences, but instead constrain the activation of available information about the attitude object; (3) the 
modulating function of these cues remains intact even when they become directly associated with an evaluative response; 
(4) contextualized representations of counterattitudinal information can be activated by contexts that are either perceptually 
or conceptually similar to the context in which the counterattitudinal experience took place. Implications for context effects 
and attitude change are discussed.  
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To the resentment of observers searching for cross-
situational consistency in attitudes, people’s likes and 
dislikes can be vexingly different across contexts (Smith 
& Semin, 2004). Evaluations of objects, individuals, and 
social groups may be favorable in one context but 
unfavorable in another. Such context effects have been 
shown not only for deliberate evaluative judgments, but 
also for spontaneous evaluative responses that are less 
susceptible to voluntary control (for reviews, see Blair, 
2002; Gawronski & Sritharan, 2010). In attitude 
research, these findings have sparked theoretical debates 
about whether evaluations are the product of relatively 
stable attitudinal representations that are directly 
retrieved from memory (Fazio, 2007) or constructed 
online on the basis of momentarily accessible attributes 
(Schwarz, 2007).  
The current research expands on the debate between 
dispositional and constructivist accounts of attitudes by 
investigating the integration of contextual information 
into the mental representation of attitude objects, with a 
particular focus on the role of incidental visual cues of 
the environmental context. The central assumption 
underlying this research is that basic principles of 
expectancy violation and attention determine whether 
incidental visual cues are integrated into the 
representation of evaluative information about an 
attitude object, thereby influencing the contextual 
conditions under which this information is activated 
during subsequent encounters with that object. In the 
current studies, we tested several novel predictions 
derived from this account and explored the role of 
perceptual and conceptual context features in the 
activation of contextualized attitudes.  
Online Constructions versus Stable Dispositions 
The available evidence for context effects on 
spontaneous and deliberate evaluations has led some 
researchers to reject the idea that evaluations are the 
product of stored attitudinal representations that are 
directly retrieved from memory (e.g., Schwarz, 2007). 
Instead, it is argued that evaluations are constructed on 
the spot on the basis of momentarily accessible concepts 
(see also Ferguson & Bargh, 2007; Lord & Lepper, 1999; 
Wilson & Hodges, 1992). Accessibility of mental 
concepts is further assumed to depend on incidental 
features of the context. For example, contextual cues may 
influence the momentary accessibility of positive or 
negative exemplars of a given category (e.g., the context 
of a basketball court may activate different exemplars of 
the category African American than the context of a 
graffiti wall), which may moderate evaluative responses 
to other members of the same category (e.g., 
Bodenhausen, Schwarz, Bless, & Wänke, 1995; Sia, 
Lord, Blessum, Ratcliff, & Lepper, 1997). Thus, 
evaluations should be consistent across different contexts 
to the extent that these contexts activate mental concepts 
of the same valence. If, however, the valence of activated 
concepts differs across contexts, the resulting evaluations 
should be inconsistent across contexts.  
Such constructivist interpretations of context effects 
differ from dispositional accounts which conceptualize 
attitudes as enduring representations that are directly 
retrieved from memory (e.g., Fazio, 2007; Petty, Briñol, 
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& DeMarree, 2007). Although dispositional accounts 
may seem difficult to reconcile with the available 
evidence for context effects on spontaneous and 
deliberate evaluations, some researchers have argued that 
context effects do not reflect differences in the evaluation 
of a given object, but differences in the object that is 
being evaluated (Fazio, 2007). The central argument is 
that evaluative responses to a given object depend on 
how the object is categorized, with category evaluations 
being determined by stored attitudinal representations 
(e.g., Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2005; Olson & Fazio, 
2003; but see Gawronski, Cunningham, LeBel, & 
Deutsch, 2010). For example, a young African American 
man may elicit a more favorable response when he is 
categorized in terms of his age (activating a positive 
category representation of young people) than when he is 
categorized in terms of his race (activating a negative 
category representation of African Americans). Thus, the 
same object may elicit different evaluative responses 
across different contexts to the extent that contextual 
cues lead to different categorizations of a given object.  
A Representational Account of Context Effects  
Although constructivist and dispositional accounts are 
quite different, it is extremely difficult to empirically 
distinguish between them, because either account can 
explain any possible context effect in a post-hoc fashion 
(Schwarz & Bohner, 2001). To tackle this issue, it would 
be necessary to go beyond a posteriori explanations of 
context effects and instead formulate a priori predictions 
about the conditions under which evaluative responses 
should be context-dependent or context-independent (cf. 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, in press). In a first step to 
address this challenging task, Gawronski, Rydell, 
Vervliet, and De Houwer (2010) proposed a 
representational account that integrates central features 
of both theoretical approaches. On the one hand, this 
account includes a constructivist component, in that 
contextual cues are assumed to moderate evaluative 
responses by influencing the momentary accessibility of 
evaluative information. On the other hand, their account 
includes a dispositional component, in that contextual 
cues are assumed to operate on the basis of stored 
representations of evaluative information. Yet, deviating 
from the overarching focus of the two approaches on 
various kinds of context effects (for reviews, see Blair, 
2002; Gawronski & Sritharan, 2010), Gawronski et al.’s 
representational account is specifically concerned with 
the effects of incidental visual cues of the environmental 
context.   
A central aspect of their account concerns the 
conditions under which incidental visual cues are 
integrated into the mental representation of evaluative 
information about an object. To the extent that there is no 
prior knowledge about an attitude object, exposure to 
evaluative information about the object is assumed to 
produce a mental trace that links the object to that 
information (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). If this 
link is sufficiently strong, future encounters with the 
object should activate the associated information, leading 
to an evaluative response that is in line with this 
information. Moreover, new information that is 
evaluatively congruent with the initially acquired 
information will simply be added to the existing 
representation, thereby increasing the likelihood of a 
corresponding evaluative response during future 
encounters with the attitude object. Thus, as long as 
available information about an attitude object is 
evaluatively congruent, evaluations of the object should 
be consistent across contexts and reflect the valence of 
the stored information (e.g., Rydell & Gawronski, 2009).  
An important question is what happens when new 
information about an attitude object is evaluatively 
incongruent with initially acquired information. Drawing 
on basic principles of expectancy violation (Roese & 
Sherman, 2007), Gawronski et al. (2010) argued that 
exposure to counterattitudinal information enhances 
attention to the momentary context in order to identify 
factors that may resolve the inconsistency between the 
initial expectancy and the newly acquired information 
(cf. Festinger, 1957; Gawronski, 2012). As a result of this 
attentional tuning, incidental visual cues of the 
environmental context become integrated in a 
contextualized representation of the newly acquired 
counterattitudinal information (see also Rosas & 
Callejas-Aguilera, 2007). However, instead of erasing 
the initially formed representation from memory, the 
newly formed contextualized representation is simply 
added to the existing memory structures (Bouton, 1994). 
Hence, the mental representation of the attitude object 
can be said to acquire a “dual” nature, in that it comprises 
(1) a context-free representation that includes the object 
and the initially acquired attitudinal information, and (2) 
a contextualized representation that includes the object, 
the subsequently acquired counterattitudinal 
information, and the context in which this information 
was acquired. For example, if a person forms a favorable 
first impression of a new colleague at work and this 
impression is later challenged by negative behavior of 
that person at the gym, the initial positive information 
will be stored in a context-free representation that is not 
specifically tied to the work context, whereas the 
subsequent negative information will be stored in a 
contextualized representation that includes the gym 
context.  
Gawronski et al.’s (2010) representational account 
resembles earlier theories assuming that 
counterattitudinal information does not erase previously 
acquired attitudinal information from memory, but 
instead produces two distinct attitudinal traces that 
influence evaluative responses under different conditions 
(e.g., Petty, Tormala, Briñol, & Jarvis, 2006; Wilson, 
Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). According to these theories, 
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earlier acquired attitudinal information is often highly 
overlearned, such that it is activated automatically upon 
encounter of an attitude object. In contrast, more recently 
acquired counterattitudinal information is assumed to 
require more effort to be retrieved from memory, 
implying that it should influence evaluative responses 
only under conditions of controlled processing. Thus, 
whereas initial attitudinal information is assumed to 
determine spontaneous responses, effects of 
counterattitudinal information are assumed to be limited 
to deliberate responses. Gawronski et al.’s (2010) 
representational account differs from these theories by 
assuming that incidental visual cues of the environmental 
context, rather than conditions of automatic versus 
controlled processing, determine the activation of initial 
attitudinal and subsequent counterattitudinal 
information. This idea is reflected in the notion of 
contextualized attitude change, which is outlined in the 
following section.  
Contextualized Attitude Change 
The hypothesized integration of contextual cues into 
the representation of counterattitudinal information has 
several important implications. First, it implies that 
effects of counterattitudinal information are often limited 
to the context in which this information was acquired. In 
other words, attitude change is contextualized such that 
evaluations of the attitude object reflect the valence of 
the counterattitudinal information only in the context in 
which this information had been acquired. Yet, 
evaluations tend to reflect the valence of the initial 
attitudinal information in any other context, be it the 
context in which the initial attitudinal information had 
been acquired or a novel context in which the target had 
not been encountered before (e.g., Rydell & Gawronski, 
2009).  
In research on animal learning, such context-
dependent recurrence of an initially acquired response is 
typically referred to as renewal effect (Bouton, 2004). 
Depending on the contexts during (1) the acquisition of 
initial attitudinal information, (2) the acquisition of 
subsequent counterattitudinal information, and (3) the 
elicitation of an evaluative response, it is possible to 
distinguish between three different kinds of renewal 
effects in attitude formation and change (see Table 1). 
ABA renewal refers to cases in which an initial attitudinal 
response is acquired in Context A, a counterattitudinal 
response is acquired in a different Context B, and the 
initial attitudinal response recurs in the initial Context A 
(e.g., Bouton & Bolles, 1979; Bouton & Peck, 1989). 
ABC renewal refers to cases in which an initial attitudinal 
response is acquired in Context A, a counterattitudinal 
response is acquired in a different Context B, and the 
initial attitudinal response recurs in a novel Context C 
(e.g., Bouton & Bolles, 1979; Bouton & Brooks, 1993). 
Finally, AAB renewal refers to cases in which an initial 
attitudinal response is acquired in Context A, a 
counterattitudinal response is acquired in the same 
Context A, and the initial attitudinal response recurs in a 
novel Context B (e.g., Bouton & Ricker, 1994; Tamai & 
Nakajima, 2000). Taken together, the three kinds of 
renewal effects imply that effects of counterattitudinal 
information are often limited to the context in which the 
counterattitudinal information had been acquired. Yet, 
whenever the target is encountered in a context that is 
different from the one in which the counterattitudinal 
information had been acquired, the initially acquired 
attitudinal information will determine evaluations of the 
target.  
In addition to the fact that counterattitudinal 
information will influence evaluations only in the context 
in which it has been acquired, another important aspect 
of contextualized attitude change is that it implies 
systematic differences in evaluations across contexts (see 
Table 2). For example, if initial attitudinal information 
about an object is acquired in Context A and then 
challenged by counterattitudinal information in another 
Context B, comparing evaluations across Context A and 
Context B should reveal inconsistent responses across 
the two contexts. In this case, evaluations should reflect 
the valence of the initial attitudinal information in 
Context A, but the valence of the counterattitudinal 
information in Context B. Similarly, if initial attitudinal 
information about an object is acquired in Context A and 
then challenged by counterattitudinal information in 
another Context B, comparing evaluations in Context B 
to evaluations in a novel Context C should also reveal 
inconsistent responses. In this case, evaluations should 
reflect the valence of the initial attitudinal information in 
the novel Context C, but the valence of the 
counterattitudinal information in Context B. In contrast, 
if initial attitudinal information about an object is 
acquired in Context A and then challenged by 
counterattitudinal information in another Context B, 
comparing evaluations in Context A to evaluations in a 
novel Context C should reveal consistent responses 
across the two contexts. In this case, evaluations should 
reflect the valence of the initial attitudinal information in 
both Context A and Context C. Finally, if initial 
attitudinal information about an object is acquired in 
Context A and then challenged by counterattitudinal 
information in the same Context A, comparing 
evaluations in Context A to evaluations in a novel 
Context B should reveal inconsistent responses across 
the two contexts. In this case, evaluations should reflect 
the valence of the initial attitudinal information in 
Context B, but the valence of the counterattitudinal 
information in Context A. 
These patterns are well-established in research on 
extinction and counterconditioning in animal learning 
(for a review, see Bouton, 2004) and relapse in the 
clinical treatment of affective disorders (for a review, see 
Vervliet, Craske, & Hermans, 2013). The first evidence 
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for similar patterns in the formation and change of social 
attitudes was obtained in a series of studies by Rydell and 
Gawronski (2009) who demonstrated the emergence of 
ABA renewal and ABC renewal in impression 
formation. Evidence for AAB renewal in impression 
formation was obtained by Gawronski et al. (2010), who 
also provided preliminary evidence for the proposed 
representational account. Consistent with the predictions 
derived from this account, their results showed that (1) 
the impact of initial attitudinal information on 
evaluations in novel contexts was reduced when attention 
to contextual cues during the encoding of initial 
attitudinal information was experimentally enhanced and 
(2) context effects were eliminated altogether when 
attention to contextual cues during the encoding of 
counterattitudinal information was experimentally 
reduced. These results are consistent with the 
hypothesized contribution of attentional processes to the 
integration of contextual cues into the representation of 
evaluative information.  
The Present Research 
Although Gawronski et al.’s (2010) findings are 
consistent with the predictions of their representational 
account, there are still a number of important questions 
about how contextualized attitudes are formed, how they 
are represented in memory, and how they are activated 
upon future encounters with the attitude object. To 
address these questions, the current research aimed to 
provide deeper insights into (1) the conditions under 
which incidental visual cues of the environmental 
context are integrated into the representation of newly 
acquired evaluative information, (2) how these 
contextual cues are stored and represented in memory, 
and (3) which features of visual context cues determine 
the activation of contextualized representations. Toward 
this end, Experiments 1a and 1b investigated recollective 
memory for incidental context cues as a function of 
whether these cues were present during the encoding of 
attitude-congruent versus attitude-incongruent 
information. Expanding on the results of these studies, 
Experiment 2 tested whether contextual cues become 
directly associated with the valence of counterattitudinal 
information (evaluative binding) or instead are stored in 
a manner such that they constrain the activation of 
evaluative information in response to the attitude object 
(occasion setting). Experiment 3 investigated whether 
the modulating function of contextual cues remains intact 
when these cues become later associated with an 
evaluative response. Finally, Experiment 4 explored 
which features of incidental visual cues determine the 
activation of contextualized attitudes by testing effects of 
contexts that are either perceptually or conceptually 
                                                 
1 For all of the presented studies, we report all data exclusions (if any), 
all manipulations, and all measures. All sample sizes were determined 
on the basis of prior research using similar paradigms and availability 
similar to the context in which counterattitudinal 
information had been acquired. Taken together, these 
studies provide deeper insights into the formation of 
contextualized attitudes, the nature of their mental 
representation, and their activation by different kinds of 
contextual cues.1 
Experiment 1a 
The main goal of Experiment 1a was to test the 
hypothesis that incidental visual cues of the 
environmental context tend to be integrated into the 
mental representation of attitude-incongruent, but not 
attitude-congruent, information. To test this hypothesis, 
participants received either positive or negative 
information about an unknown target individual and 
were then exposed to information that was either 
congruent or incongruent with the valence of the initial 
information. Participants’ task was to form an impression 
of the target on the basis of the presented information. To 
investigate the integration of incidental context cues into 
the representation of evaluative information, the 
information about the target individual was presented 
against different background colors. After the impression 
formation task, participants were asked to complete a 
surprise recognition test in which they were asked to 
indicate the background color against which the critical 
target information had been presented. Based on the 
assumption that incidental context cues are integrated 
into the mental representation of expectancy-violating 
counterattitudinal information, recognition memory for 
the colored backgrounds was expected to be more 
accurate when the critical target information was 
incongruent than when it was congruent with the valence 
of the initial information.  
Method 
Participants and design. A total of 125 participants 
(93 women, 32 men) were recruited for a one-hour 
battery on “Perception of Consumer Products and 
Impression Formation” that included the current 
experiment and two additional experiments that were 
unrelated to this study. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the four conditions of a 2 (Valence of Initial 
Information: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Valence of 
Target Statement: congruent with initial information vs. 
incongruent with initial information) between-subjects 
design. Due to a computer malfunction, recognition data 
from three participants were not recorded. Thus, the final 
sample included 122 participants. All participants 
received research credit for an introductory psychology 
course. 
Impression formation task. Participants were told 
that the main goal of the study was to investigate how 
people form first impressions of other individuals. They 
of subjects. All data collections were conducted without intermittent 
statistical analyses until we reached the predetermined sample sizes. 
All materials are available from the authors upon request. 
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were further informed that they would be presented with 
information about a person named Bob, and that their 
task was to form a first impression of Bob based on the 
presented information. Over the course of 30 trials, 
participants read brief descriptions of 30 behaviors that 
Bob had performed while a picture of Bob was presented 
simultaneously on the screen. The statements and the 
picture of the target person were adopted from Rydell 
and Gawronski (2009). The picture of Bob appeared 
slightly above and the statement slightly below the center 
of the screen. Picture-statement pairs were presented for 
5000 ms with an inter-trial interval of 1000 ms. The first 
20 statements were used to create an impression of Bob 
as being either likeable (e.g., Bob bought groceries for 
an elderly lady next door who was ill.) or dislikeable 
(e.g., Bob continually yells at his girlfriend in public.). 
The 21st statement was used as the critical target trial that 
was either congruent or incongruent with the valence of 
the initial information. The remaining 9 trials after the 
critical target statement served as filler items, including 
9 statements that had the same valence as the initial 20 
trials. To investigate participants’ memory for incidental 
context cues, each statement was presented against 1 of 
10 different background colors. The color displays fully 
covered the background of the computer screen and 
appeared only during the 5000 ms presentation of the 
picture-statement pairs. The computer screen turned 
black during the 1000 ms inter-trial interval. The 
background colors were randomized in a blocked 
manner, such that each color appeared once during the 
first block of 10 statements, once during the second block 
of 10 statements, and once during the third block of 10 
statements. The critical target statement was presented 
against the same background color in each of the four 
experimental conditions. The statements of the initial 20 
trials and the 9 filler trials at the end were randomly 
selected from lists of 29 positive and 29 negative 
statements. For the critical target item, we used the same 
positive statement (i.e., Bob donates blood on a regular 
basis.) and the same negative statement (i.e., Bob robbed 
a convenience store.) in the two expectancy conditions.  
Recognition task. After participants completed the 
impression formation task, they were given a surprise 
recognition test in which they were asked to recall the 
background color against which a given statement had 
been presented during the impression formation task. On 
each trial of the recognition task, participants were 
presented with 10 squares displaying the 10 background 
colors at the top of the screen, and one of the statements 
of the impression formation task at the bottom of the 
screen. The background colors were numbered from 0 to 
9 including a label that specified the color. Participants 
were asked to press the number key on the computer 
keyboard that corresponded to the background color 
against which the statement had been presented during 
the impression formation task. The recognition task 
started with 3 statements that were randomly selected 
from the list of 29 irrelevant trials. The fourth trial of the 
recognition task was the critical test trial, including the 
statement that was either congruent or incongruent with 
the initial information. The recognition task proceeded 
with 3 statements that were randomly selected from the 
list of 29 irrelevant trials. The primary dependent 
measure was whether participants correctly recalled the 
background color of the critical target statement that was 
either congruent or incongruent with the valence of the 
initial information about the target individual.  
Results 
Figure 1 displays the proportions of participants who 
correctly recalled the background color of the critical 
target statement within each of the four experimental 
conditions. The proportions of correct responses 
significantly differed as a function of Valence of Target 
Statement, χ2(1) = 12.36, p < .001, but not as a function 
of Valence of Initial Information, χ2(1) = 1.41, p = .24. 
In line with our prediction, recognition memory for the 
task-irrelevant background color was more accurate 
when the valence of the target statement was incongruent 
with the initial information than when it was congruent 
with the initial information. This effect was statistically 
significant regardless of whether the initial information 
was positive, χ2(1) = 7.65, p = .006, or negative, χ2(1) = 
4.88, p = .03. The recognition advantage for incongruent 
target statements did not significantly differ as a function 
of whether the initial information was positive or 
negative, χ2(1) = 2.77, p = .10. Moreover, the valence of 
the initial information did not influence recognition 
memory for the task-irrelevant background-color 
regardless of whether of the target statement was 
congruent, χ2(1) = 0.26, p = .61, or incongruent, χ2(1) = 
1.32, p = .25, with the initial information. Memory 
performance was significantly above the chance level of 
10% when the target statement was incongruent, t(62) = 
4.12, p < .001, d = .52, but not when it was congruent, 
t(58) = -0.42, p = .68, d = .05, with the initial information.  
Discussion 
The main goal of Experiment 1a was to test the 
hypothesis that incidental visual cues of the 
environmental context tend to be integrated into the 
mental representation of attitude-incongruent, but not 
attitude-congruent, information. Based on this 
hypothesis, we expected recognition memory for 
incidental context cues to be more accurate when these 
cues were present during the encoding of attitude-
incongruent than attitude-congruent information. 
Consistent with this prediction, Experiment 1a showed 
that recognition memory for the background color 
against which evaluative information had been presented 
was at chance level when this information was congruent 
with the valence of initially acquired information. 
However, recognition memory for the task-irrelevant 
background color improved significantly when the target 
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information was incongruent with the valence of initially 
acquired information. These results are consistent with 
the hypothesis that attitude-congruent experiences tend 
to be stored in context-free representations, whereas 
attitude-incongruent experiences are stored in 
contextualized representations. 
Experiment 1b 
A potential concern about Experiment 1a is that the 
manipulation of expectancy-violation during encoding 
was confounded with expectancy-violation in the 
recognition task. Because the recognition task included 
several attitude-congruent filler items before the 
presentation of the critical target item, one could argue 
that expectancy-violation during the recognition task 
might have contributed to the obtained effects. To rule 
out this concern, we conducted a follow-up study in 
which the critical target statement was presented as the 
very first item in the recognition task. Based on the 
findings in Experiment 1a, we expected that recognition 
memory for the background color should be at chance 
level when the target information was congruent with the 
valence of the initial information. Yet, recognition 
memory should be significantly enhanced when the 
target information was incongruent with the valence of 
the initial information. 
Method 
Participants and design. A total of 94 participants (57 
women, 37 men) were recruited for a one-hour battery on 
“Face Perception and Humor” that included the current 
experiment and one additional experiment that was 
unrelated to the current study. Because the additional 
experiment in this battery involved responses to racial 
humor, the current study was always conducted at the 
beginning of the session to avoid potential mood effects 
resulting from the humor manipulation. Participants were 
randomly assigned to the four conditions of a 2 (Valence 
of Initial Information: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Valence 
of Target Statement: congruent with initial information 
vs. incongruent with initial information) between-
subjects design. Due to a computer malfunction, 
recognition data from two participants were not recorded, 
which left us with a final sample of 92 participants. All 
participants received research credit for an introductory 
psychology course. 
Materials and measures. The impression formation 
task was identical to the one in Experiment 1a. Aside 
from presenting the critical target statement as the first 
item, the recognition task was also identical to the one in 
Experiment 1a.  
Results 
Figure 2 shows the proportions of participants who 
correctly recalled the background color of the critical 
target statement within each of the four experimental 
conditions. The number of correct responses 
significantly differed as a function of Valence of Target 
Statement, χ2(1) = 9.48, p = .002, but not as a function of 
Valence of Initial Information, χ2(1) = 1.27, p = .26. 
Recognition memory for the task-irrelevant background 
color was again higher when the valence of the target 
statement was incongruent with the initial information 
than when it was congruent with the initial information. 
This effect was statistically significant when the initial 
information was positive, χ2(1) = 5.63, p = .02, and 
marginally significant when the initial information was 
negative, χ2(1) = 3.68, p = .06. The recognition advantage 
for incongruent target statements did not significantly 
differ as a function of whether the initial information was 
positive or negative, χ2(1) = 1.95, p = .16. Moreover, the 
valence of the initial information did not influence 
recognition memory for the task-irrelevant background-
color regardless of whether of the target statement was 
congruent, χ2(1) = 0.27, p = .60, or incongruent, χ2(1) = 
0.83, p = .36, with the valence of the initial information. 
Memory performance was again significantly above the 
chance level of 10% when the target statement was 
incongruent, t(42) = 3.65, p = .001, d = .56, but not when 
it was congruent, t(48) = 0.05, p = .96, d = .007, with the 
valence of the initial information. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1b corroborate the 
hypothesis that incidental visual cues of the 
environmental context tend to be integrated into the 
mental representation of attitude-incongruent, but not 
attitude-congruent, information. To rule out potential 
concerns about a confound between the manipulation of 
expectancy-violation during encoding and expectancy-
violation during retrieval in Experiment 1a, the current 
study presented the critical target statement as the very 
first item in the recognition task. Replicating the results 
of Experiment 1a, recognition memory for the task-
irrelevant background color was at chance level when the 
target information was congruent with the valence of the 
initially acquired information. However, recognition 
memory for the background color significantly improved 
when the target information was incongruent with the 
valence of the initially acquired information. These 
results provide further support for the hypothesis that 
attitude-congruent experiences are stored in context-free 
representations, whereas attitude-incongruent 
experiences are stored in contextualized representations. 
Experiment 2 
Although the findings of Experiments 1a and 1b 
suggest that incidental visual cues of the environmental 
context are integrated into the representation of attitude-
incongruent information, they do not indicate how 
incidental context cues are represented in memory (see 
Bouton, 2010; Vervliet, Baeyens, Van den Bergh, & 
Hermans, 2013). On the one hand, it is possible that 
contextual cues are stored in a manner such that they 
constrain which information is activated by the target. On 
the other hand, contextual cues might become directly 
associated with the valence of the counterattitudinal 
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experience, such that they influence evaluative responses 
over and above the impact of the information that is 
available about the target. To illustrate the difference 
between the two cases, consider the earlier example in 
which a person formed a favorable first impression of a 
new colleague at work and this impression is later 
challenged by that person’s negative behavior at the gym. 
In this case, subsequent encounters with the target at the 
gym may elicit a negative response because either (1) the 
gym context facilitates the activation of negative 
information about the target and inhibits the activation of 
positive information or (2) the gym directly elicits a 
negative response over and above the response that is 
based on the available information about the target.  
The first interpretation is consistent with the notion of 
occasion setting, suggesting that contextual cues are 
represented as modulatory nodes that determine whether 
the initial attitudinal information or the subsequent 
counterattitudinal information is activated in response to 
the attitude object (Schmajuk & Holland, 1998). 
According to this account, contextualized 
representations constrain the spread of activation from 
the attitude object to the available evaluative information 
by virtue of inhibitory links (see Bouton, 2002). If the 
context during the encoding of counterattitudinal 
experiences is absent, activation of the attitude object is 
assumed to spread to the initial attitudinal information, 
which in turn inhibits the activation of the 
counterattitudinal information. In contrast, if the context 
during the encoding of counterattitudinal experiences is 
present, activation of the context node is assumed to 
inhibit the link between the attitude object and the initial 
attitudinal information, thereby gating the spread of 
activation from the attitude object to the 
counterattitudinal information, which further inhibits the 
activation of the initial attitudinal information.  
The second interpretation is consistent with the notion 
of evaluative binding, suggesting that enhanced attention 
to contextual cues during the acquisition of 
counterattitudinal information may create a direct link 
between the representation of these cues and the 
counterattitudinal experience (see Rescorla & Wagner, 
1972). From this perspective, context effects on 
evaluative responses may reflect additive effects of 
independent excitatory links between (1) the attitude 
object and the available information about that object and 
(2) the context during the acquisition of 
counterattitudinal information and the counterattitudinal 
experience. As a result, activation of the 
counterattitudinal experience should be stronger when 
the attitude object is encountered in the context in which 
this experience had been made than when it is 
encountered in any other context.  
Previous research tried to differentiate occasion setting 
from evaluative binding by comparing evaluative 
responses to a given target individual to those elicited by 
other unknown individuals within the same contexts. The 
general finding was that contextual cues moderated 
evaluative responses to the target individual, but not 
evaluative responses to other unknown individuals that 
were presented in the same contexts (Gawronski et al., 
2010; Rydell & Gawronski, 2009). Although these 
findings are consistent with the notion of occasion 
setting, a major limitation is that the null effect of 
contextual cues in influencing evaluative responses to 
unknown individuals could be due to incidental features 
of the unknown individuals. Specifically, it is possible 
that incidental facial features of the unknown individuals 
elicited a positive or negative response (e.g., Gawronski 
& Quinn, 2013), which may dilute or override the 
simultaneous effects of contextual cues. Such incidental 
effects could undermine the possibility of detecting 
direct effects of the contextual cues, thereby leading to 
the incorrect conclusion that the obtained context effects 
are driven by occasion setting rather than evaluative 
binding.  
Another limitation of previous experiments is that they 
involved a perfect contingency between context and 
valence. Because participants always received positive 
information in one context and negative information in 
another context, there was a systematic relation between 
context and valence. Thus, context effects could be due 
not only to occasion setting, but also to the formation of 
direct associations between context and valence (see De 
Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001).  
One way to rule out evaluative binding is to eliminate 
the contingency between context and valence, which 
should attenuate context effects resulting from additive 
excitatory links. To the extent that a given context is 
paired with an equal number of positive and negative 
experiences, excitatory links between context and 
valence should lead to a neutral (or ambivalent) response 
to the context. The same should be true for the attitude 
object, which should be associated with both positive and 
negative information. Thus, if there is no contingency 
between context and valence, additive effects of 
independent excitatory links should lead to neutral (or 
ambivalent) responses regardless of the context. In 
contrast, the notion of occasion setting implies that 
contextual cues constrain the evaluative information that 
is activated in response to the attitude object without 
being directly associated with the counterattitudinal 
experience. According to this account, contextual cues 
should moderate the evaluative response that is elicited 
by an attitude object even if there is no contingency 
between context and valence. 
The main goal of Experiment 2 was to test these 
competing predictions by presenting evaluative 
information about two individuals rather than one. To 
avoid any contingency between context and valence, one 
of the two targets was described as positive in an initial 
Context A, whereas the other one was described as 
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negative in the same Context A. In a subsequent block, 
the initially positive target was presented with negative 
information in a second Context B, while the initially 
negative target was presented with positive information 
in the same Context B. Finally, evaluative responses 
toward the two targets were assessed in the initial 
Context A, the second Context B, and a novel Context C 
that was not part of the impression formation task.  
To the extent that context effects stem from direct 
associations between context and valence (evaluative 
binding), the absence of context-valence contingencies in 
the current study should eliminate context effects on 
evaluative responses to the two targets. If, however, 
contextual cues are represented in a manner such that 
they constrain the activation of available information 
through inhibitory links (occasion setting), context 
effects on evaluative responses to the two targets should 
be unaffected by the absence of context-valence 
contingencies. According to the latter account, the two 
targets should elicit evaluative responses in line with the 
counterattitudinal information only when they are 
presented in the context in which the counterattitudinal 
information had been acquired. However, when the two 
targets are presented in contexts that are different from 
the one in which the counterattitudinal information had 
been acquired, the initially acquired attitudinal 
information should determine evaluations of the targets.  
Method 
Participants and design. A total of 91 participants (57 
women, 30 men, 4 missing) were recruited for a one-hour 
battery on “How Do We Form Impressions of People and 
Images?” that included the present experiment and two 
additional experiments that were unrelated to this study. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the four 
conditions of a 2 (Order of Background Color: yellow-
blue vs. blue-yellow) × 2 (Target Valence in First 
Learning Block: Target1-positive/Target2-negative vs. 
Target1-negative/Target2-positive) between-subjects 
design. Due to an experimenter error, four participants 
failed to complete this experiment. This left us with a 
final sample of 87 participants. All participants received 
research credit for an introductory psychology course. 
Impression formation task. Participants were told 
that this study investigated how people form first 
impressions of other individuals. They were further 
informed that they would be presented with information 
about two individuals, and that their task was to form a 
first impression of these individuals based on the 
presented information. In the first block of the 
impression formation task, participants were presented 
with statements about 25 positive behaviors that one of 
the two targets had performed and 25 negative behaviors 
that the other target had performed. For both targets, a 
picture of a male individual was presented 
simultaneously with the statements. The statements were 
adopted from Rydell and Gawronski (2009). The picture 
of the targets appeared slightly above and the statement 
slightly below the center of the screen. Picture-statement 
pairs were presented for 5000 ms with an inter-trial 
interval of 1000 ms. The picture-statement pairs were 
presented against a colored background (e.g., yellow) 
that continually remained on the screen during the entire 
block. The order of the picture-statement pairs was 
randomized individually for each participant.  
After participants had completed the first block of the 
impression formation, they were presented with more 
information about the two targets against a differently 
colored background (e.g., blue). However, different from 
the first learning block, the target that was initially 
described in a positive manner was now described with 
25 negative behaviors and the target that was initially 
described in a negative manner was now described with 
25 positive behaviors. The procedural parameters were 
identical to those in the first learning block. For half of 
the participants the background color during the first 
learning block was yellow and the background color of 
the second learning block was blue; for the remaining 
half the background color during the first learning block 
was blue and the background color of the second learning 
block was yellow. In addition, we counterbalanced which 
of the two targets was presented with positive versus 
negative behaviors in the first block and correspondingly 
with negative versus positive behaviors in the second 
block.  
Speeded evaluation task. After participants 
completed the impression formation task, their responses 
to the two targets in different contexts were assessed with 
a speeded evaluation task. The measure was designed to 
combine central features of similar paradigms by 
Ranganath, Smith, and Nosek (2008) and Payne, 
Burkley, and Stokes (2008). The task included brief 
presentations of the two target individuals against the 
background color of the first learning block, the 
background color of the second learning block, and a new 
background color that was not presented during the 
impression formation task (i.e., white). Each trial started 
with a fixation cross which was displayed for 500 ms in 
the center of the screen. The fixation cross was followed 
by the presentation of one of the two targets against one 
of the three backgrounds for 100 ms, which was followed 
by blank screen for 100 ms. Participants were then 
prompted by a question mark in the center of the screen 
to indicate whether their immediate “gut” response to the 
presented stimulus was positive or negative. Participants 
were asked to press a right-hand key (Numpad 5) if their 
immediate gut response was positive and a left-hand key 
(A) if their immediate gut response was negative. 
Participants were told they have only one second to 
provide their response. If participants did not respond 
within 1000 ms after the onset of the target image, the 
message Please try to respond faster! was presented for 
2000 ms on the screen. The speeded evaluation task 
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included 10 trials for each of the two targets against each 
of the three colored backgrounds, summing up to a total 
of 60 trials.  
Results 
Responses on the speeded evaluation task were 
aggregated by calculating the mean proportion of 
positive responses for each of the six target-background 
combinations (i.e., Target1-yellow, Target1-blue, 
Target1-white; Target2-yellow, Target2-blue, Target2-
white). The data were then collapsed across the 
counterbalanced method factors of Color Order and 
Target Valence to obtain two primary within-subjects 
factors. The first within-subjects factor captured the 
order of valence for the two target individuals (i.e., 
positive-negative, negative-positive); the second within-
subjects factor captured the nature of the background 
with reference to the impression formation task (i.e., first 
context, second context, novel context). Due to slow 
responses that exceeded the response deadline of 1000 
ms, two participants had missing values for at least one 
of the six target-background combinations. Data from 
these participants were excluded from the analyses to 
avoid sample-based confounds in the report of statistical 
effects. 
Submitted to a 2 (Target Valence Order: positive-
negative vs. negative-positive) × 3 (Context: first vs. 
second vs. novel) ANOVA for repeated measures, 
evaluation scores revealed a significant interaction of the 
two factors, F(2, 168) = 7.11, p = .001, ηp2 = .078 (see 
Figure 3). When the targets were presented against the 
background of the first learning block, participants 
showed more favorable responses to the target that was 
described as positive in the first block (and negative in 
the second block) than the target that was described as 
negative in the first block (and positive in the second 
block), t(84) = 2.01, p = .047, d = .22. In contrast, when 
the targets were presented against the background of the 
second learning block, participants tended to show more 
favorable responses to the target that was described as 
negative in the first block (and positive in the second 
block) than the target that was described as positive in 
the first block (and negative in the second block), t(84) = 
1.88, p = .064, d = .20. Finally, when the targets were 
presented against a novel background that was not 
presented during the impression formation task, 
participants tended to show more favorable responses to 
the target that was described as positive in the first block 
(and negative in the second block) than the target that 
was described as negative in the first block (and positive 
in the second block), t(84) = 1.77, p = .081, d = .19.  
Discussion 
The main goal of Experiment 2 was to test whether 
contextual cues during the acquisition of 
counterattitudinal information become directly 
associated with the valence of the counterattitudinal 
experience (evaluative binding) or whether they are 
represented in a manner such that they constrain which 
information is activated in response to the attitude object 
(occasion setting). Consistent with the latter hypothesis, 
evaluative responses were moderated by the presence 
versus absence of a contextual cue despite the absence of 
any contingency between the contextual cue and valence. 
Specifically, we found that evaluative responses to two 
targets reflected the valence of counterattitudinal 
information about the targets only when the targets were 
encountered in the context in which the 
counterattitudinal information had been acquired. 
However, when the targets were encountered either in the 
context of the initial attitudinal experience or in a novel 
context, they tended to elicit evaluative responses in line 
with the initial information about the attitude object. 
Importantly, the relevant contexts were paired with an 
equal number of positive and negative statements to 
avoid any contingency between context and valence. As 
such, the current findings are consistent with the notion 
of occasion setting, assuming that contextual cues 
constrain the spread of activation from the attitude object 
to the available information by virtue of inhibitory links. 
However, the current findings are difficult to reconcile 
with the notion of evaluative binding, which attributes 
context effects to direct associations between context and 
valence. Thus, expanding on the results of Experiments 
1a and 1b showing that incidental visual cues of the 
environmental context tend to be integrated into the 
representation of attitude-incongruent but not attitude-
congruent experiences, Experiment 2 suggests that 
context cues do not become directly associated with the 
valence of attitude-incongruent experiences, but instead 
are stored in a manner such that they constrain which 
information is activated by the target.  
Experiment 3 
Although the results of Experiment 2 indicate that the 
obtained context effects do not stem from direct 
associations between context and valence, an important 
question remains: do contextual cues retain this 
modulating function when they themselves become 
directly associated with an evaluative response? For 
example, if negative experiences were made with a 
positively evaluated person in the context of a gym, will 
visual cues related to the gym context continue to 
activate a negative response toward the target when the 
gym context becomes associated with a positive 
response? In addition to providing deeper insights into 
different ways by which contextual cues may influence 
evaluative responses (see Bouton, 2010), persistence in 
contextual modulation after “counterconditioning” 
provides further evidence that the modulating function of 
contextual cues does not depend on direct associative 
links between context and valence (see De Houwer, 
Crombez, & Baeyens, 2005). To the extent that the initial 
modulating function of contextual cues remains intact if 
they become directly associated with an evaluative 
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response of the opposite valence, evaluative binding can 
be ruled out as a mechanism underlying the obtained 
context effects. However, such a finding would 
corroborate the notion of occasion setting, implying that 
contextual cues constrain the spread of activation from 
the attitude object to the available information by virtue 
of inhibitory links.  
In Experiment 3, we addressed this question by 
repeatedly pairing context cues with positive or negative 
stimuli after participants had completed an impression 
formation task similar to the one in Experiment 2. On the 
basis of previous research on evaluative conditioning (for 
a meta-analysis, see Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, 
Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010), we expected that repeated 
pairings of context cues with positive and negative 
images influence evaluative responses to these cues in 
line with the valence of the images. More importantly, 
these newly formed associations between context and 
valence were expected to leave the modulating function 
of the contexts unaffected, such that the contexts should 
continue to moderate the evaluative response that is 
elicited by a given target.  
Method 
Participants and design. A total of 100 participants 
(77 women, 23 men) were recruited for a one-hour 
battery on “First Impressions, Language, and Memory” 
that included the current experiment and two additional 
experiments that were unrelated to this study. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the eight 
conditions of a 2 (Order of Background Color: yellow-
blue vs. blue-yellow) × 2 (Target Valence in First 
Learning Block: Target1-positive/Target2-negative vs. 
Target1-negative/Target2-positive) × 2 (Context 
Conditioning: yellow-positive/blue-negative vs. yellow-
negative/blue-positive) between-subjects design. All 
participants received research credit for an introductory 
psychology course. 
Impression formation task. The impression 
formation task was identical to the one in Experiment 2.  
Context conditioning task. The evaluative 
conditioning procedure involved repeated pairings of the 
two background colors of the impression formation task 
with positive and negative images. The task was 
described as a visual perception exercise (see Gawronski, 
Balas, & Creighton, 2014; Gawronski & Mitchell, 2014). 
Participants were instructed to pay close attention to the 
pictures and told that we will ask them a number of 
questions about the pictures after the task. One 
background color was repeatedly paired with positive 
images and the other was repeatedly paired with negative 
images. Each trial of the task involved the presentation 
of an image against one of the two backgrounds for 1000 
ms. The inter-trial interval was 2000 ms. As 
unconditioned stimuli, we used two positive and two 
negative images from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS, Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) 
showing a baby seal (Image 1440; mean valence = 8.19), 
bunnies (Image 1750; mean valence = 8.28), a single 
cockroach (Image 1270; mean valence = 3.68), and 
several cockroaches (Image 1271; mean valence = 3.19). 
Each background was paired 8 times with each of the 2 
images of the same valence, for a total of 32 conditioning 
trials.  
Speeded evaluation task. The speeded evaluation task 
was identical to the one employed in Experiment 2 with 
one exception. Instead of presenting the two target 
individuals against a novel background that was not 
presented during the impression formation task, we 
included trials on which only one of the two background 
colors were presented, without either of the target 
individuals. Each of the six stimuli (i.e., Target1-yellow; 
Target1-blue; Target2-yellow; Target2-blue; yellow-
alone; blue-alone) was presented 10 times, for a total of 
60 trials. All participants completed the speeded 
evaluation task twice: once after the impression 
formation task and once after the context conditioning 
task. 
Procedure. Participants initially completed the two 
blocks of the impression formation task, which was 
followed by the speeded evaluation task. Participants 
were then asked to complete the visual perception 
exercise that included the context conditioning task, 
followed by a second administration of the speeded 
evaluation task.  
Results 
Responses on the speeded evaluation task were 
aggregated by calculating the mean proportion of 
positive responses for each of the six stimuli (i.e., 
Target1-yellow; Target1-blue; Target2-yellow; Target2-
blue; yellow-alone; blue-alone) at each of the two 
measurement times (i.e., before conditioning vs. after 
conditioning). Due to slow responses that exceeded the 
response deadline of 1000 ms, four participants had 
missing values for at least one of the 12 measurements 
(i.e., 6 stimuli at 2 measurement times). As in 
Experiment 2, data from these participants were excluded 
from the following analyses to avoid sample-based 
confounds in the report of statistical effects.  
Manipulation check. To confirm the effectiveness of 
our context conditioning manipulation, evaluative 
responses to the colors alone were submitted to a 2 
(Context: first vs. second) × 2 (Time: before conditioning 
vs. after conditioning) × 2 (Context Conditioning: first-
positive/second-negative vs. first-negative/second-
positive) mixed-model ANOVA with the first two 
variables as within-subjects factors and the third variable 
as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed a 
significant two-way interaction of Context Conditioning 
and Context, F(1, 94) = 17.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .157, which 
was qualified by a significant three-way interaction of 
Context Conditioning, Context, and Time, F(1, 94) = 
20.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .179. To decompose this 
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interaction, we conducted separate 2 (Context) × 2 
(Context Conditioning) ANOVAs for each of the two 
measurement points. The ANOVA did not show any 
significant main or interaction effect on evaluations 
before conditioning (all Fs < 1.39, all ps > .24). In 
contrast, evaluations after conditioning revealed a 
significant two-way interaction of Context Conditioning 
and Context, F(1, 94) = 32.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .254. When 
the first context was paired with positive images and the 
second context with negative images, participants 
showed more favorable responses to the first context than 
the second context (Ms = .73 vs. .39), t(47) = 3.70, p = 
.001, d = .53. In contrast, when the first context was 
paired with negative images and the second context with 
positive images, participants showed more favorable 
responses to the second context than the first context (Ms 
= .72 vs. .36), t(47) = 4.30, p < .001, d = .62. These results 
support the effectiveness of our context conditioning 
manipulation to influence evaluative responses to the 
background colors.  
Evaluations of target individuals. To investigate 
whether the conditioning of background colors 
influenced the modulating function of the second 
background, evaluative responses to the two targets were 
submitted to a 2 (Target Valence Order: positive-
negative vs. negative-positive) × 2 (Context: first vs. 
second) × 2 (Time: before context conditioning vs. after 
context conditioning) × 2 (Context Conditioning: first-
positive/second-negative vs. first-negative/second-
positive) mixed-model ANOVA with the first three 
variables as within-subjects factors and the fourth 
variable as a between-subjects factor. This analysis 
revealed a significant two-way interaction of Target 
Valence Order and Context, F(1, 94) = 15.34, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .140 (see Figure 4). When the targets were 
presented against the background of the first learning 
block, participants showed more favorable responses to 
the target that was described as positive in the first block 
(and negative in the second block) than the target that 
was described as negative in the first block (and positive 
in the second block), F(1, 94) = 6.58, p = .01, ηp2 = .065. 
In contrast, when the targets were presented against the 
background of the second learning block, participants 
showed more favorable responses to the target that was 
described as negative in the first block (and positive in 
the second block) than the target that was described as 
positive in the first block (and negative in the second 
block), F(1, 94) = 8.66, p = .004, ηp2 = .084. Importantly, 
this two-way interaction remained unqualified by higher-
order interactions with Time (all Fs < 1, all ps > .50), 
indicating that evaluative conditioning of the contexts 
did not eliminate their effectiveness in moderating 
evaluative responses to the targets. The critical two-way 
interaction of Target Valence Order and Context was 
statistically significant before context conditioning, F(1, 
94) = 9.11, p = .003, ηp2 = .088 (see Figure 4, left panel), 
and after context conditioning, F(1, 94) = 12.26, p = .001, 
ηp2 = .115 (see Figure 4, right panel).  
Interestingly, the analysis also showed a significant 
two-way interaction of Context Conditioning and 
Context, F(1, 94) = 18.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .161, which 
was qualified by a significant three-way interaction of 
Context Conditioning, Context, and Time, F(1, 94) = 
37.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .286 (see Figure 5). This three-way 
interaction indicates that evaluative responses to targets 
within the two contexts were further influenced by the 
conditioned valence of the contexts. Corresponding to 
the pattern obtained for the backgrounds alone, Context 
Conditioning and Context did not show any significant 
effects before context conditioning (all Fs < 1, all ps > 
.44) (see Figure 5, left panel). However, evaluations after 
context conditioning revealed a significant two-way 
interaction of Context Conditioning and Context, F(1, 
94) = 39.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .296 (see Figure 5, right 
panel). When the first context was paired with positive 
images and the second context with negative images, 
participants showed more favorable responses to the two 
targets in the first context than in the second context, F(1, 
47) = 16.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .261. In contrast, when the 
first context was paired with negative images and the 
second context with positive images, participants showed 
more favorable responses to the two targets in the second 
context than in the first context, F(1, 47) = 23.01, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .329.  
Discussion 
The main goal of Experiment 3 was to test whether the 
modulating function of contextual cues remains intact 
when the contexts themselves acquire a particular 
valence. Consistent with this assumption, contextual 
cues continued to moderate the evaluative response that 
was elicited by a given target even when the contextual 
cues became subsequently associated with a particular 
valence by virtue of repeated pairings with positive or 
negative stimuli. In fact, our results showed that 
contextual cues that independently acquired a particular 
valence can have two distinct effects on evaluative 
responses (see also Urcelay, Witnauer, & Miller, 2012). 
First, they can influence the evaluative response that is 
elicited by an object within that context independent of 
their own valence (moderating effect). Second, they can 
elicit an evaluative response reflecting their own valence 
independent of the evaluative response that is elicited by 
the target within that context (direct effect). The current 
findings indicate that both processes can operate 
simultaneously, suggesting that contextual cues retain 
their modulatory function as occasion setters even when 
the contextual cues themselves become directly 
associated with a particular valence. Using the example 
from the introduction to this experiment, if negative 
experiences were made with a positively evaluated target 
in the context of a gym and the gym becomes 
subsequently associated with a positive response, visual 
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cues related to the gym context will have two distinct 
effects when the target is encountered at the gym: (1) 
they will constrain the activation of available information 
about the target, leading to a negative response toward 
the target within the gym context, and (2) they will 
directly elicit a positive response despite the negative 
response that is elicited by the target within the gym 
context.  
Experiment 4 
The experiments reported so far demonstrate that (1) 
incidental visual cues of the environmental context tend 
to be integrated into the representation of attitude-
incongruent, but not attitude-incongruent, experiences; 
(2) these cues are not directly associated with the valence 
of counterattitudinal experiences, but instead constrain 
the activation of available information about the attitude 
object; and (3) this modulatory function remains intact 
even when the contextual cues become directly 
associated with a particular evaluative response. Toward 
this end, our studies have focused on effects of relatively 
simple, one-dimensional visual cues, such as the 
background color of the computer screen. However, two 
important questions that our work has yet to address are: 
(1) do context effects resulting from these processes 
generalize to real-world contexts with higher levels of 
visual complexity, and if so, (2) which features of 
complex real-world contexts determine the activation of 
contextualized representations? For example, if 
counterattitudinal experiences have occurred with an 
attitude object in the context of a seminar room, does 
only the same seminar room activate the representation 
of the counterattitudinal experience or will other contexts 
that are similar to the seminar room have the same effect? 
If similar contexts can have the same effect, in which 
particular sense do they have to resemble the context in 
which the counterattitudinal experience was made? 
Would any seminar room have the same effect even if it 
is perceptually dissimilar to the one in which the 
counterattitudinal experience was made (e.g., a 
perceptually distinct seminar room in a different 
building)? Alternatively, would a room that is 
perceptually similar to the seminar room have the same 
effect even if it is not a seminar room (e.g., a dining hall 
that visually resembles the seminar room)?  
Experiment 4 addressed these questions by 
investigating effects of real-world contexts that were 
either perceptually or conceptually similar to the context 
in which the counterattitudinal experience took place. 
Toward this end, participants were presented with 
evaluatively incongruent information about two target 
individuals against different real-world backgrounds. 
Evaluative responses to the two targets were then 
measured against (1) the background of the initial 
attitudinal information, (2) the background of the 
counterattitudinal information, (3) a background that was 
perceptually similar to, but conceptually distinct from, 
the background against which the counterattitudinal 
information had been presented, (4) a background that 
was conceptually similar to, but perceptually distinct 
from, the background against which the 
counterattitudinal information had been presented, and 
(5) a background that was both perceptually and 
conceptually distinct from the background against which 
the counterattitudinal information had been presented. 
Based on our earlier findings, we predicted that 
evaluative responses to the targets reflect the valence of 
the initial attitudinal information when they are presented 
against the background of the initial attitudinal 
information (ABA renewal) and when they are presented 
against a background that is both perceptually and 
conceptually distinct from the background against which 
the counterattitudinal information had been presented 
(ABC renewal). In contrast, evaluative responses to the 
targets should reflect the valence of the counterattitudinal 
information when they are presented against the 
background of the counterattitudinal information. The 
central question was whether backgrounds that are either 
perceptually or conceptually similar to the background of 
the counterattitudinal information elicit evaluative 
responses in line with the valence of the 
counterattitudinal information.  
Method 
Participants and design. A total of 120 participants 
(90 women, 30 men) were recruited for a one-hour 
battery on “Forming Impressions of Faces, Groups, and 
People” that included the current experiment and two 
unrelated experiments. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the eight conditions of a 2 (Target Valence in 
First Learning Block: Target1-positive/Target2-negative 
vs. Target1-negative/Target2-positive) × 4 (Second 
Context: Picture 1 vs. Picture 2 vs. Picture 3 vs. Picture 
4) between-subjects design. The second factor involved 
the counterbalanced use of four different real-world 
images during the presentation of counterattitudinal 
information, which provided the basis for our 
manipulation of perceptual and conceptual similarity. All 
participants received research credit for an introductory 
psychology course. 
Materials. To investigate which context features 
determine the activation of contextualized attitudes, we 
used Adobe Photoshop® to create a set of eight images 
that displayed one of two target individuals against four 
different real-world backgrounds (see Figure 6). Two of 
the backgrounds showed trees; the other two 
backgrounds showed windmills. Images showing the 
same type of object (e.g., windmills) were used to 
operationalize the conceptual similarity of different 
contexts. In addition, the images were matched 
perceptually, such that each of the two windmill images 
was visually similar to one of the two tree images in 
terms of structure and color. This matching procedure 
served as the basis of our operationalization of perceptual 
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similarity. Thus, for each of the four backgrounds, the set 
included one background that was (1) perceptually 
similar but conceptually distinct, (2) conceptually similar 
but perceptually distinct, and (3) both perceptually and 
conceptually distinct. One of these images was used in 
the second block of the impression formation task; the 
evaluation measure included all four backgrounds to 
investigate the role of perceptual versus conceptual 
features of contexts. The selection of the four 
backgrounds for the impression formation task was 
counterbalanced across participants. In addition to the set 
of images that were matched for perceptual versus 
conceptual similarity, we created one image for the first 
block of the impression formation task that displayed the 
target against a real-world background that was both 
perceptually and conceptually distinct from the four 
images in the set (i.e., sunset).  
Impression formation task. Participants were told 
that the main goal of the study was to investigate how 
people form first impressions of other individuals. They 
were further informed that they would be presented with 
information about two target individuals, and that their 
task was to form a first impression of the two individuals 
based on the presented information. Over the course of 
50 randomly presented trials, participants read about 25 
positive behaviors that one of the targets had performed 
and 25 negative behaviors that the other target had 
performed (see Rydell & Gawronski, 2009). The 
mapping of the two targets with either positive or 
negative statements was counterbalanced across 
participants. Each statement was presented together with 
a picture that showed the target person against the 
background of a sunset. The picture of the target 
appeared slightly above and the statement slightly below 
the center of the screen. Picture-statement pairs were 
presented for 5000 ms with an inter-trial interval of 1000 
ms.  
After participants had completed the first block of the 
impression formation task, they were presented with 
more information about the two target individuals, who 
were now presented against a different real-world 
background. The particular background was selected 
from the set of four images that were matched for 
perceptual and conceptual similarity (see Figure 6). The 
target that was presented with 25 positive behaviors in 
the first block was presented with 25 negative behaviors 
in the second block; the target that was presented with 25 
negative behaviors in the first block was presented with 
25 positive behaviors in the second block. The 
procedural parameters were identical to those in the first 
learning block.  
Speeded evaluation task. The speeded evaluation task 
was similar to the one employed in Experiment 2. The 
stimuli in the current study were images of the two target 
individuals against (1) the background of first block of 
the impression formation task, (2) the background of the 
second block of the impression formation task, (3) a 
background that was perceptually similar to, but 
conceptually distinct from, the background of the second 
block, (4) a background that was conceptually similar to, 
but perceptually distinct from, the background of the 
second block, and (5) a background that was both 
perceptually and conceptually distinct from the 
background of the second block. Each of the 10 target-
context combinations was presented 15 times, summing 
up to a total of 150 trials. The procedural parameters of 
the speeded evaluation task were identical to the ones in 
Experiment 2.    
Results 
Responses on the speeded evaluation task were 
aggregated by calculating the mean proportion of 
positive responses for each of the 10 target-background 
combinations. The data were then collapsed across the 
two counterbalanced method factors to obtain two 
primary within-subjects factors. The first within-subjects 
factor captured the order of valence for the two target 
individuals (i.e., positive-negative; negative-positive); 
the second within-subjects factor captured the nature of 
the background with reference to the impression 
formation task (i.e., first context; second context; 
perceptually similar to second context; conceptually 
similar to second context; distinct from second context). 
Submitted to a 2 (Valence Order: positive-negative vs. 
negative-positive) × 5 (Context: first context vs. second 
context vs. perceptually similar to second context vs. 
conceptually similar to second context vs. distinct from 
second context) ANOVA for repeated measures, 
evaluation scores revealed a significant main effect of 
Valence Order, F(1, 119) = 7.22, p = .008, ηp2 = .057, 
indicating that participants showed more favorable 
responses to the target that was presented with negative 
information in the first block (and positive information 
in the second block) than the target that was presented 
with positive information in the first block (and negative 
information in the second block). More importantly, this 
main effect was qualified by a significant two-way 
interaction of Valence Order and Context, F(4, 476) = 
13.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .102 (see Figure 7). To decompose 
this interaction, we tested simple main effects of Valence 
Order within each of the five context conditions.  
When the targets were presented against the 
background of the first learning block, participants 
showed more favorable responses to the target person 
that was presented with positive information in the first 
block (and negative information in the second block) 
than the target person that was presented with negative 
information in the first block (and positive information 
in the second block), t(119) = 2.33, p = .02, d = .21. In 
contrast, when the targets were presented against the 
background of the second learning block, participants 
showed more favorable responses to the target person 
that was presented with negative information in the first 
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block (and positive information in the second block) than 
the target person that was presented with positive 
information in the first block (and negative information 
in the second block), t(119) = -5.43, p < .001, d = .50. 
The same effect was obtained when (1) the two targets 
were presented against a background that was 
perceptually similar to, but conceptually distinct from, 
the background of the second learning block, t(119) = -
2.40, p = .02, d = .22, and (2) the two targets were 
presented against a background that was conceptually 
similar to, but perceptually distinct from, the background 
of the second learning block, t(119) = -3.54, p = .001, d 
= .32. In either case, participants showed more favorable 
responses to the target person that was presented with 
negative information in the first block (and positive 
information in the second block) than the target person 
that was presented with positive information in the first 
block (and negative information in the second block). 
Finally, when the targets were presented against a 
background that was both perceptually and conceptually 
distinct from the background of the second learning 
block, participants showed more favorable responses to 
the target person that was presented with positive 
information in the first block (and negative information 
in the second block) than the target person that was 
presented with negative information in the first block 
(and positive information in the second block), t(119) = 
2.34, p = .02, d = .21.  
Discussion 
The main goal of Experiment 4 was to investigate (1) 
whether our findings generalize to visual real-world 
contexts with higher levels of complexity, and if so, (2) 
which features of complex real-world contexts—
perceptual or conceptual—determine the activation of 
contextualized representations. In addition to replicating 
our basic findings for real-world contexts with higher 
levels of visual complexity, the results of Experiment 4 
indicate that contextualized representations of 
counterattitudinal experiences can be activated by either 
(1) contexts that are perceptually similar to, but 
conceptually distinct from, the context in which the 
counterattitudinal experience had been made, or (2) 
contexts that are conceptually similar to, but perceptually 
distinct from, the context in which the counterattitudinal 
experience took place. Both kinds of contexts produced 
evaluative target responses that reflected the valence of 
the counterattitudinal experience with the target. In 
contrast, contexts that were both perceptually and 
                                                 
2 For the sake of full disclosure, we would like to note that another study 
in our lab replicated the current findings for contexts that were 
perceptually similar to, but conceptually distinct from, the context in 
which counterattitudinal information had been acquired. However, 
contexts that were conceptually similar to, but perceptually distinct 
from, the context in which counterattitudinal information had been 
acquired produced evaluative responses that reflected a mixture of 
attitudinal and counterattitudinal information. Although the 
conceptually distinct from the context in which the 
counterattitudinal experience had been made produced a 
renewal effect, such that evaluative responses reflected 
the valence of the initial experience with the target (ABC 
renewal). The same was true for the context in which the 
initial attitudinal experience had been made, which 
elicited evaluative target responses that were in line with 
the initial attitudinal experience (ABA renewal). Taken 
together, these results indicate that contextualized 
representations can be activated by contexts that are 
either perceptually or conceptually similar to the context 
in which counterattitudinal information had been 
acquired.2   
General Discussion 
Across five experiments, we investigated the 
formation, representation, and activation of 
contextualized attitudes. Drawing on basic principles of 
expectancy violation (Roese & Sherman, 2007), we 
argued that exposure to counterattitudinal information 
enhances attention toward the momentary context, 
thereby leading to an integration of incidental visual cues 
of the environmental context into the representation of 
the newly acquired counterattitudinal information. As a 
result of this process, the mental representation of the 
attitude object acquires a “dual” nature, in that it 
comprises (1) a context-free representation that includes 
the object and the initially acquired attitudinal 
information, and (2) a contextualized representation that 
includes the object, the subsequently acquired 
counterattitudinal information, and the context in which 
this information had been acquired. From this 
perspective, attitude change is often contextualized in the 
sense that evaluations of an object reflect the valence of 
counterattitudinal experiences only in the context in 
which these experiences had been made. However, 
evaluations tend to reflect the valence of initial attitudinal 
experiences in other contexts, be it the context in which 
the initial attitudinal experience had been made or novel 
contexts that are distinct from the one in which the 
counterattitudinal experience had been made. 
Expanding on earlier evidence for these assumptions 
(e.g., Gawronski et al., 2010; Rydell & Gawronski, 
2009), the current research addressed three important 
questions: (1) under which conditions are incidental 
context cues integrated into the representation of newly 
acquired evaluative information, (2) how are these cues 
are stored and represented in memory, and (3) which 
features of visual context cues determine the activation 
discrepancy between the two studies could be due to sampling error or 
differences in the experimental procedures (i.e., different design, 
different measure), it is possible that the obtained effects depend on 
boundary conditions that still need to be identified. Nevertheless, the 
current findings clearly indicate that both perceptually and 
conceptually similar contexts have the potential to activate 
contextualized representations of counterattitudinal experiences. 
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of contextualized representations? Experiments 1a and 
1b investigated recollective memory for incidental 
context cues as a function of whether these cues were 
present during the encoding of target information that 
was either congruent or incongruent with the valence of 
initially acquired information. Consistent with the 
assumption that contextual cues tend to be integrated into 
the representation of attitude-incongruent information, 
but not attitude-congruent information, recognition 
memory for incidental context cues was higher when the 
target information was incongruent than when it was 
congruent with the valence of the initial information. 
Expanding in these findings, Experiment 2 tested 
whether contextual cues during the acquisition of 
counterattitudinal information become directly 
associated with the valence of the counterattitudinal 
experience (evaluative binding) or instead are 
represented in a manner such that they constrain the 
activation of evaluative information in response to the 
attitude object (occasion setting). Consistent with the 
latter hypothesis, evaluative responses were moderated 
by the presence versus absence of a contextual cue even 
when this cue was paired with equal amounts of positive 
and negative information. Experiment 3 tested whether 
this modulating function remains intact when the 
contexts themselves become directly associated with an 
evaluative response. Our results showed that contextual 
cues continued to moderate the evaluative response that 
was elicited by an attitude object even when the context 
cues became independently associated with an evaluative 
response. In this case, contextual cues had two 
simultaneous effects on evaluative responses. First, they 
influenced the evaluative response that was elicited by an 
object within that context independent of their own 
valence (moderating effect). Second, they elicited 
evaluative responses that were congruent with their 
associated valence independent of the evaluative 
response that was elicited by the target within that 
context (direct effect). Finally, Experiment 4 
investigated which features of visual context cues 
determine the activation of contextualized 
representations. The results of this study indicate that 
contextualized representations of counterattitudinal 
information can be activated by contexts that are either 
perceptually or conceptually similar to the context in 
which the counterattitudinal experience had been made. 
Either kind of context produced an evaluative response 
that reflected the valence of the counterattitudinal 
experience. In contrast, contexts that were both 
perceptually and conceptually distinct from the context 
in which the counterattitudinal experience had been 
made produced a renewal effect, reflecting the valence of 
the initial attitudinal information. 
Implications for Context Effects 
The accumulating body of evidence for context effects 
on spontaneous and deliberate evaluations has sparked 
theoretical debates about whether evaluations reflect 
online constructions on the basis of momentarily 
accessible attributes (e.g., Schwarz, 2007) or stable 
attitudinal representations that are directly retrieved from 
memory (e.g., Fazio, 2007). The current research 
expands on this debate by integrating central components 
of both accounts. On the one hand, the proposed account 
includes a constructivist component, in that contextual 
cues are assumed to moderate which experiences with an 
attitude object are activated in response to the object. The 
central assumption is that counterattitudinal experiences 
are activated only in the context in which these 
experiences were made (or other contexts that are 
visually similar to the one in which the counterattitudinal 
experiences were made), whereas initial attitudinal 
experiences are activated in any other context. On the 
other hand, the current account includes a dispositional 
component by assuming that contextual cues moderate 
evaluative responses on the basis of stored attitudinal 
representations. Specifically, the current account 
assumes that enhanced attention to incidental visual cues 
during the encoding of counterattitudinal information 
leads to an integration of these cues into the mental 
representation of the counterattitudinal information. 
Because the contextualization of counterattitudinal 
information leaves the initial attitudinal representation 
intact, attitudes can be said to have a dispositional 
component that is difficult to change and effective in 
influencing evaluations despite observable change in 
response to counterattitudinal information. 
Although the current research provides important 
insights into the mental processes and representations 
underlying a particular type of contextual influence (i.e., 
context effects resulting from enhanced attention to 
incidental visual cues during the encoding of 
counterattitudinal information), it is important to 
acknowledge the role of other processes that may 
contribute to context effects over and above the ones 
investigated in the current work. For example, context 
stimuli may influence evaluations by providing different 
comparison standards (Mussweiler, 2003), and such 
context effects may occur for both spontaneous and 
deliberate evaluations (e.g., Gawronski, Deutsch, & 
Seidel, 2005; Scherer & Lambert, 2009). Moreover, 
incidental characteristics of contexts (e.g., background 
noise) may influence meta-cognitive inferences about the 
diagnosticity of momentarily activated information, 
thereby influencing the weighting and use of that 
information (Schwarz, 1998). There are also various 
influences involving features of the measurement 
context, such as question order and response formats 
(Schwarz, 1999). Such context effects differ from the 
ones investigated in the current research, in that the 
relevant contextual cues are not necessarily included in 
the mental representation of the attitude object. More 
importantly, whereas earlier research on context effects 
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focused exclusively on the processes involved in the 
generation of an evaluative response, the current work 
adopts a more comprehensive view that includes (1) the 
processes that determine the inclusion of contextual 
information into the mental representation of evaluative 
information, (2) the particular manner in which 
contextual information is integrated into the 
representation of evaluative information, and (3) the 
processes that determine the activation of conflicting 
information about an attitude object. As such, the current 
work offers novel insights into the formation, 
representation, and activation of contextualized attitudes, 
and the situated construction of evaluative responses on 
the basis of stored information. 
The current findings suggest that incidental visual cues 
of the environmental context function in a manner similar 
to retrieval cues, in that they determine which 
components of the mental representation of an 
evaluatively heterogeneous attitude object are activated 
in response to that object (Gawronski & Cesario, 2013). 
However, our findings remain ambiguous as to whether 
these representational components involve information 
about concrete attitudinal experiences or abstract 
information about valence. For example, in line with the 
assumptions of exemplar-based models (e.g., Smith & 
Zárate, 1992), contextual cues may influence which 
concrete experiences with an attitude object are activated 
in response to that object. Alternatively, it is possible that 
evaluatively incongruent experiences are integrated into 
two abstract representations of the attitude object as 
being positive versus negative (e.g., Fazio, 2007). 
Finally, it is possible that mental representations of 
evaluative information include both concrete and 
abstract knowledge, with the type of representation 
differing for initial attitudinal and subsequent 
counterattitudinal information. For example, initial 
attitudinal experiences may be integrated in abstract 
representations of the attitude object as being either 
positive or negative, whereas the representation of 
subsequent counterattitudinal information may involve 
concrete experiences with the attitude object. Although 
debates between abstraction and exemplar-based theories 
are extremely difficult to resolve (Barsalou, 1990), we 
consider the question of whether contextualized 
representations involve abstract or concrete information 
an important and interesting topic for future research in 
this area.  
Implications for Attitude Change 
The current findings also have important implications 
for understanding the effectiveness of manipulations that 
attempt to change attitudes. A common question in basic 
and applied research is whether experimentally induced 
changes in evaluations reflect enduring changes in the 
underlying attitudinal representation or temporary shifts 
that may dissipate over time (e.g., Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2007, 2011; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). To 
address this question, participants are often brought back 
into the lab several days or weeks after the experimental 
manipulation. To the extent that the initially observed 
effect remains stable over time, it is assumed that the 
employed manipulation was effective in producing 
enduring long-term change in the underlying attitudinal 
representation (e.g., Devine, Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 
2012; Förderer & Unkelbach, 2013; Haugtvedt & Petty, 
1992; Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 
2000; Olson & Fazio, 2006). However, the current work 
suggests that, although the observed changes may be 
stable within the same context over time, they may not 
generalize to other visually distinct contexts. Indeed, it is 
possible that changes observed in the lab do not 
generalize to other contexts outside of the lab even when 
the observed change in the lab is stable over time. Thus, 
to establish the effectiveness of manipulations to induce 
enduring changes that generalize across contexts, it is 
important to include not only delayed follow-up 
measurements, but also measurements in contexts that 
are different from the one in which the manipulation took 
place (e.g., Devine et al., 2012). At a broader level, this 
conclusion resonates with Mischel and Shoda’s (1995) 
notion of IF-THEN conditionals reflecting idiosyncratic 
situation-behavior profiles, which implies that 
individuals may show behavioral consistency over time 
within a particular context, even if behavioral 
consistency across contexts is low.  
An important task for future research on attitude 
change is to identify ways to increase the generalization 
of counterattitudinal information across distinct contexts. 
Although this question has received relatively little 
attention in social psychology, clinical research on 
contextual relapse suggests that counterattitudinal 
experiences in multiple different contexts can enhance 
the generalization of these experiences across novel 
contexts (e.g., Gunter, Denniston, & Miller, 1998; 
Vansteenwegen, Vervliet, Iberico, Baeyens, Van den 
Bergh, & Hermans, 2007; see also Gawronski et al., 
2010). Future research investigating the impact of 
attitude change manipulations across visually distinct 
contexts would be helpful to gain a deeper understanding 
of their overall effectiveness.  
Spontaneous versus Deliberate Evaluation 
By showing that initial attitudinal and subsequent 
counterattitudinal information can influence evaluative 
responses under different conditions, the current findings 
expand on earlier theories suggesting that 
counterattitudinal information does not erase previously 
acquired attitudinal information from memory (e.g., 
Petty et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2000). A central 
assumption of these theories is that spontaneous 
responses tend to reflect the valence of initial attitudinal 
information whereas effects of counterattitudinal 
information are limited to deliberate responses. The 
present research demonstrates the significance of another 
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important factor by showing that incidental visual cues 
of the environmental context can influence whether 
initial attitudinal or subsequent counterattitudinal 
information is activated in response to an attitude object. 
Yet, an important question is whether the current 
findings generalize to more deliberate judgments that go 
beyond self-reports of spontaneous “gut” responses. 
Although the evaluation measures in the current research 
can be described as “explicit” in the sense that they 
involved intentional evaluations of the targets (De 
Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009), the 
inclusion of response deadlines makes them more similar 
to “implicit” measures, capturing spontaneous rather 
than deliberate responses (e.g., Ranganath et al., 2008). 
Thus, an important question is whether similar effects 
can be obtained under conditions that allow for more 
elaborate processing.   
Based on the proposal that occasion setters may 
function in a manner similar to retrieval cues (Gawronski 
& Cesario, 2013), one could argue that contextual cues 
in the current studies influenced which information came 
to mind most rapidly upon encountering a target. With 
increasing delays, however, deliberate processing may 
involve the retrieval of other target-related information, 
including information that has been learned in other 
contexts (cf. Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, & Van Bavel, 
2007; Wojnowicz, Ferguson, Dale, & Spivey, 2009). In 
this case, perceivers would have to resolve the resulting 
inconsistency between conflicting pieces of evaluative 
information to avoid a state of attitudinal ambivalence 
(Van Harreveld, Van der Pligt, & De Liver, 2009).  
Although speculative at this point, these assumptions 
have two important implications. First, they imply that 
contextualized representations can prevent attitudinal 
ambivalence for spontaneous evaluative responses by 
preventing the simultaneous activation of conflicting 
information during early processing stages. 
Nevertheless, ambivalence may arise during later 
processing stages to the extent that deliberate processing 
involves the retrieval of other target-related information, 
including information that has been learned in other 
contexts. Second, if other target-related information is 
retrieved for more deliberate judgments, an important 
question is how perceivers deal with the conflict between 
initial attitudinal and subsequent counterattitudinal 
information. One possibility is implied by research on 
ease-of-retrieval effects (Schwarz, Bless, Strack, 
Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka, & Simons, 1991), 
suggesting that people may attribute higher validity to 
information that comes to mind easily and discount the 
validity of information that requires cognitive effort to be 
retrieved from memory (Tormala, Petty, & Briñol, 2002). 
In this case, deliberate evaluations may show the same 
patterns of context effects that we found for spontaneous 
evaluations, such that they reflect the valence of 
information that comes to mind most rapidly within a 
given context (see also Gawronski et al., 2010; Rydell & 
Gawronski, 2009). Alternatively, it is possible that less 
accessible information is given equal weight in an 
integrated judgment that combines all available 
information regardless of how rapidly it comes to mind. 
In this case, the patterns of context effects obtained for 
spontaneous evaluations may not necessarily generalize 
to deliberate evaluations, which may instead reflect 
neutral or ambivalent responses regardless of the context. 
Although the correspondence between spontaneous and 
deliberate evaluations can be moderated by various other 
factors (for a review, see Hofmann, Gschwendner, 
Nosek, & Schmitt, 2005), future research may help to 
clarify the commonalities and differences between 
spontaneous and deliberate evaluations in their 
susceptibility to the kinds of context effects 
demonstrated in the current work. 
Conclusion 
The main goal of the present research was to provide 
deeper insights into the formation, representation, and 
activation of contextualized attitudes. Drawing on 
Gawronski et al.’s (2010) representational account, we 
argued that initial attitudinal information is typically 
stored in context-free representations, whereas 
subsequent counterattitudinal information is stored in 
contextualized representations. Thus, counterattitudinal 
experiences tend to influence evaluative responses only 
in the context in which these experiences have been 
made, whereas initially acquired attitudinal information 
influences responses in any other context, be it the 
context in which the initial information was acquired or 
novel contexts that are distinct from one in which the 
counterattitudinal experience had been made. The 
present research expands on earlier evidence for these 
hypotheses by providing deeper insights into (1) the 
conditions under which incidental visual cues of the 
environmental context are integrated into the 
representation of newly acquired evaluative information, 
(2) how these contextual cues are stored and represented 
in memory, and (3) which features of visual context cues 
determine the activation of contextualized 
representations. By integrating components of both 
constructivist and representational accounts, the current 
work not only encourages a new way of thinking about 
context effects; it also stipulates a contextualized view on 
the effectiveness of attitude change that is consistent with 
the notion of idiosyncratic situation-behavior profiles.  
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Table 1. Different kinds of renewal effects and their definitions. Table adapted from Gawronski and Cesario (2013). 
Reprinted with permission.  
Effect Description 
ABA Renewal Learning of a particular response in Context A 
Learning of a new response in Context B 
Renewal of the initially learned response in the initial Context A 
ABC Renewal Learning of a particular response in Context A 
Learning of a new response in Context B 
Renewal of the initially learned response in a novel Context C 
AAB Renewal Learning of a particular response in Context A 
Learning of a new response in the same Context A 
Renewal of the initially learned response in a novel Context B 
 
 
Table 2. Patterns of contexts during the acquisition of evaluative information and the measurement of evaluations, 
and their implications for empirical outcomes regarding the stability versus change of evaluation in studies on 
attitude change and the context-dependence versus context-independence of evaluations in studies on context effects. 
Table adapted from Gawronski and Cesario (2013). Reprinted with permission. 
Contexts Patterns  Empirical Outcome 
Attitude Change  
ABA Stability 
ABB Change 
ABC Stability 
AAA Change 
AAB Stability 
Context Effects  
ABA / ABB Context-dependence 
ABB / ABC Context-dependence 
ABA / ABC Context-independence 
AAA / AAB Context-dependence 
Note. The first letter in three-digit acronyms depicts the context during the acquisition of initial attitudinal 
information; the second letter depicts the context during the acquisition of subsequent counterattitudinal information; 
and the third letter depicts the context during the measurement of evaluations.  
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Figure 1. Proportion of participants with correct memory for the context (background color) of a target statement as 
a function of valence of initial information (positive vs. negative) and valence of target statement (congruent with 
initial information vs. incongruent with initial information), Experiment 1a. The dotted line depicts chance-level 
performance of 10% correct memory judgments. Error bars depict standard errors. 
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Figure 2. Proportion of participants with correct memory for the context (background color) of a target statement as 
a function of valence of initial information (positive vs. negative) and valence of target statement (congruent with 
initial information vs. incongruent with initial information), Experiment 1b. The dotted line depicts chance-level 
performance of 10% correct memory judgments. Error bars depict standard errors. 
  
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Positive Negative
M
e
m
o
ry
 f
o
r 
C
o
n
te
x
t
Congruent
Incongruent
Valence of Initial Information
Valence of Target Information
in press, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology  24 
 
Figure 3. Evaluative responses toward target individuals as a function of order of valence in impression formation 
(positive-negative vs. negative-positive) and context during the measurement of evaluative responses (first context 
vs. second context vs. third context), Experiment 2. Error bars depict standard errors. 
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Figure 4. Evaluative responses toward target individuals as a function of order of valence in impression formation 
(positive-negative vs. negative-positive), context during the measurement of evaluative responses (first context vs. 
second context), and time of measurement (before context conditioning vs. after context conditioning), Experiment 
3. Error bars depict standard errors. 
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Figure 5. Evaluative responses toward target individuals in different contexts as a function of context conditioning 
(first-positive, second-negative vs. first-negative, second-positive), context during the measurement of evaluative 
responses (first context vs. second context), and time of measurement (before context conditioning vs. after context 
conditioning), Experiment 3. Error bars depict standard errors. 
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Figure 6. Images used to manipulate perceptual versus conceptual similarity between contexts in Experiment 4. 
Images shown in the same row are perceptually similar but conceptually distinct; images in the same column are 
conceptually similar but perceptually distinct; images displayed diagonally are both perceptually and conceptually 
distinct.  
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Figure 7. Evaluative responses toward target individuals as a function of order of valence in impression formation 
(positive-negative vs. negative-positive) and context during the measurement of evaluative responses (first context 
vs. second context vs. perceptually similar to second context vs. conceptually similar to second context vs. distinct 
from second context), Experiment 4. Error bars depict standard errors. 
 
 
 
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
First Second Perceptual Conceptual Distinct
P
o
s
it
iv
it
y
Positive-Negative
Negative-Positive
Valence Order
Measurement Context
